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Diane Marie Amann 
Children withstand unique harms in periods of armed conflict and simi-
lar violence. Whether infants or juveniles, during such periods children 
often are among the most vulnerable persons. Children typically depend 
on their elders for sustenance, and so the loss of parents or other guard-
ians, coupled with the destruction of homes, displacement from com-
munities, and deprivation of basic necessities, education, or health care, 
affects them acutely. Some children do not survive war; others subsist 
along war's waysides. Still others find themselves in armed groups, where 
they may be required to aid or participate in combat and, at times, to 
endure sexual or other physical assault. In recognition of such experi-
ences, Raphael Lemldn, a foundational figure in the development of inter-
national criminal law, once wrote: The permanent psychological injury 
and the arrest of normal development of the ch ild victim is perhaps the 
most shocking and tragic result of genocide.'' 
Stories of such children have been told and retold, not only in recent 
memoirs like A Long Way Gone, an account of armed conflicts in 1990s 
West Africa, but also in much older ones like the world-famous diary 
of Anne Frank, a European teenager who lost her battle to hide from 
the Holocaust.2 Frank's story reflected a myriad of children's experiences 
during the Second World War. Nevertheless, early international criminal 
justice mechanisms paid scant attention to children's wartime plight. 
Neither the 1945 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, which 
This chapter is written solely in my personal capacity. My thanks to Stephany 
Sheriff for research assistance. 
I Stephen L. Jacobs, ed., Lemkin 0 11 Ge11ocicle, Lanham: Lexington Books, 
201 2, p. 33. 
2 Ishmael Beah, A Long Way Gone: Memoirs of a Boy Soldier, New Yor_k: Sarah 
Crichton Books/Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007; Anne Frank, The Diary of a 
Young Girl, New York: Random House/Everyman·s Library, 2010. 
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tried accused major war criminals in Germany, nor Control Council law 
No. 10, upon which twelve subsequent Nuremberg trials were based, made 
any mention of children. The same was true of the 1946 Charter estab-
lishing the Tokyo Tribunal. Even the seminal instrument of post-war col-
lective security, the Charter of the United Nations, was silent with respect 
to children. In stark contrast were institutions established at the turn of 
the twenty-first century. The statutes of both the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone and the International Criminal Court place emphasis on crimes 
against children, and both courts have convicted individuals charged with 
such crimes. The initial focus, on the recruitment and use of child soldiers, 
eventually shifted towards a more comprehensive approach. International 
Criminal Court Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda has explained that 'in addition 
to focusing on children who are forced to carry arms, we must also 
address the issue of children who are affected by arms'.3 This chapter 
first will trace developments that gave rise to the current emphasis, and 
then will examine key judgments as well as the recent move to a broader 
strategy. It will conclude by d iscussing challenges to the prevention and 
punishment of international crimes against children. 
Towards accountability for crimes against children 
Despite their charters' silence on the issue, the post-Second World War 
tribunals did not wholly ignore the effects of armed conflict on children. 
The first Nuremberg judgment contained a dozen such references. Most 
were brief mentions of children in the company of adults; for example, 
an Ei11satzgruppe leader's statement that his unit had 'liquidated approxi-
mately 90,000 men, women and children'.4 To the same effect were most 
of the five references to children in the Tokyo Tribunal's 1948 judgment5 
Still, vulnerabilities attached to chi ldhood were central to the Nuremberg 
judgment's discussions of certain Nazi practices, such as abduction and 
forced adoption in order to boost the number of persons presumed to pos-
sess what one witness called 'good blood of our type', and forced abortion 
3 Fatou Bensouda, 'Children and International Criminal Justice', (2015) 43 
Georgia Journal of lntemarional and Comparative Law forthcoming (internal 
quotations omitted; emphasis in the original). 
4 (1948) 22 IMT 491. 
5 B. V. A. Roling and C. F. Ruter, eds., The Tokyo Judgment, vol. J, Amsterdam: APA 
University Press, 1977, pp. 96, 388-9, 396, 399. 
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if, in the words of another witness, 'the child's parentage would not meet 
the racial standards'.6 Finding that the Nazis routinely had killed captives too 
young to work in concentration camps, the International Military Tribunal 
quoted from an official's affidavit: 'Very frequently women would hide their 
children under their clothes, but of course when we found them we would 
send the cbiJdren in to be exterminated. '7 Testimony at trial connected kill-
ings of children to the Nazis' ultimate goal: to eliminate an ethno-religious 
group.• 
That annihilative intent- precisely, the 'intent to destroy, in whole or 
in pan, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group'-was proscribed in 
a foremost instrument of modem international criminal law, the Convention 
on Genocide that the UN General Assembly approved in December 1948. The 
brainchild of LemJdn, this treaty aimed squarely at Second World War prac-
tices like forced adoption, and thus listed '[Oorcibly transferring children' of 
a protected group to another group as one of the ftve acts that might con-
stitute genocide. The treaty reached criminality against future generations as 
well, forbidding the imposition of 'measures intended to prevent births' in a 
protected group. 
As the onset of the Cold War stymied the enforcement of such prohibitions, 
States spoke more of protecting children from harm than of prosecuting 
harm once it occurred. The General Assembly endorsed the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which proclaimed that '(m]otherhood and 
childhood are entitled to special care and assistance', and that '[a)ll children, 
whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the sa me social protection', 
including free education 'at least in the elementary and fundamental stages'. 
In 1949, States adopted the Geneva Conventions for the protection of vic-
tims of war, the fourth of which co ntained multiple provisions intended 
to assure the identification, education, health, and well-being of infants 
and other children, during armed connict and under occupation.9 The 1977 
Additional Protocols to those universally ratified conventions reinforced this 
6 (1948) 22 IMT 480. 7 Ibid., p. 503. 
8 (1947) 4 IMT 337-338 (cross-examination of Ohlendorf). 
9 Convention (No. IV) Relative to the Protection of Civi lian Persons in Time of 
War, (1950) 75 UNTS 287, articles 14, 17, 23, 24, 38(5), 50, 82, 89, 94, 132. 
This protective array compares favourably to a legal regulation issued duri~g 
the United States Civil War: its sole reference to children recommended, yet did 
not require, notice of attack 'so that the non-combatants, and especially th~ 
women and children, may be removed before the bombardment commences. 
-
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regime. 10 The contours of protection took shape with the adoption of the 
1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 1990 African Charter 
on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, each of which embraced as general 
principles recognition of the child's rights to life and to express views in 
matters affecting him or her, as well as guarantees of non-discrimination 
and action in a child's best interests. 
These latter treaties also helped to restart efforts at prohibition; pre-
cisely, prohibition of the use or recruitment of children in armed ser-
vice. Additional Protocol I provides that '[p]arties to the conflict shall 
take all feasible measures in order that children ... do not take a direct 
part in hostilities', and further specifies that such parties 'shall refrain 
from recruiting' children under f1heen 'into their armed fo rces', while 
Additional Protocol 11 states that 'chi ldren ... shall neither be recruited 
in the armed fo rces or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities'. In 
the Children's Convention, meanwhile, States Parties similarly promise 
to 'take all feasible measures' so that young persons 'do not take a direct 
part in hostilities', and also to ' refrain from recruiting any person who 
has not attained the age of 15 years into their armed forces'. The African 
Children's Charter follows sui t, with an important innovation: whereas 
previous treaties limited the recruitment-and-use ban to children who 
had not yet attained their fiheenth birthday, this regional child rights 
instrument extended that ban to everyone under eighteen. Subsequent 
treaties, such as the 1999 Co nvention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour 
and the 2000 Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict, also opt for the eighteen-year-old threshold. 
The promulgation of these overlapping and sometimes contradictory 
treaties coincided with a Cold War thaw and consequent revival of the 
international criminal justice project begun in the Nuremberg-Tokyo era. 
The new tribunals drew note for pioneering jurisprudence with regard 
to sexual and gender-based violence - crimes that their mid-twentieth 
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, 
General Orders No. 100, article 19. 
10 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, (1979) 
1125 UNTS 3, articles 70(1), 76-8; Protocol Il Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts, ( 1979) 1125 UNTS 609, articles 4(3), 6(4). 
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century forebears had afforded a secondary priority. 11 Like lhose forebears, 
however, the new tribunals did nol dwell upon crimes against children. 
That changed after news dispatches and Grar;a Machel's 1996 UN report 
alerted public opinion to the prevalence of children - some younger than 
ten - in the ranks of national armies and rebel groups that lhen were 
waging wars across the globe. 12 
The 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the 
2002 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, therefore, both author-
ised war crimes prosecutions for the conscriplion, enlistment, and use of 
children in armed forces. Yet both statutes confined the courts' jurisdic-
tion to the recruitment or use of children under fifteen, notwithstanding 
the higher age Limit adopted in contemporaneous child rights treaties. 
In other respects, however, both statutes were products of a child rights 
vanguard, represented at the 1998 Rome Conference by UNICEF and an 
active children's caucus of non-governmental organisations, and by a 
similar coalition in the run-up to the adoption of the 2002 Special Court 
Statute.° For example, abuse of girls and abduction of girls, proscribed 
under pre-existing Sierra Leonean law, were enumerated as crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the Special Court. An initial proposal to operate a 
Special Court juvenile chamber was set aside. Although lhat Court's statute 
did authorise the prosecution of children as young as fifteen, it mandated 
that anyone convicted of a crime committed when he or she was between 
II E.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-T) , Judgment, 2 September 1998; 
Prosecutorv. Kunarac et al. (IT-96-23 El IT-96-23/ 10), Judgment, 12 June 2002. 
12 Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: Report of the Expert of the 
Secretary-General, Ms Gra\a Machel, s ubmitted pursuant to General Assembly 
Resolution 48/157, UN Doc. A/51/306, paras. 34-62. The Machel Report 
inspired the establishment of an office to coordinate efforts among UN enti-
ties including the Security Council. See Office of the Special Representative 
to the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, The Six Gra11e 
Violations Againsr Children During Armed Conjlicr: The Legal Foundarion 
(November 2009). 
13 Per Saland 'International Criminal Law Principles·, in Roy S. Lee, ed., The 
llltematio11~I Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, 
Negoriations, Resulrs, The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International, 
1999, pp. 189-216, at p. 201; llene Cohn, 'The Protection of Children an~ the 
Quest for Truth and Justice in Sierra Leone·, (2001) 55 Jou ma I of lntematronal 
Affairs I, at p. 19. 
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fifteen and eighteen years old would be subject not to imprisonment but 
rather to rehabilitation and societal reintegration. 14 
As for the Rome Statute, concern for young people is manifest in 
the very preamble: 'Mindful that during this century millions of chil-
dren, women and men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that 
deeply shock the conscience of humanity'. The drafters declared they were 
establishing the International Criminal Court ' for the sake of present and 
future generations'. Article 36 of the Statute requires States Parties to 
'take into account the need to include judges with legal expertise on ... 
violence against women or children', and article 42 further authorises 
the Prosecutor to 'appoint advisers with legal expertise on specific issues, 
including ... violence against chi ldren'. Additional provisions instruct 
Court officials to accommodate the needs of child victims and witnesses. 15 
What is more, article 26 of the Rome Statute not only excludes from the 
Court's jurisdiction 'any person who was under 18 at the time of the 
alleged commission of a crime', even as other provisions confer jurisdic-
tion over adults for a range of crimes against children. Apparently not 
content simply to list so-called generic offences li ke killing or pillaging, 
which affect adults as well as children, 16 the drafters enumerated multiple 
child-specific crimes: genocide involving the forcible transfer of chil-
dren; the crime against humanity of enslavement, denned with express 
reference to the trafficking of children; and, of course, the war crimes 
of conscription, enlistment, and use of children in armed groups. Also 
listed are numerous crimes that keenly affect children and future genera-
tions: prevention of births as genocide; sexual slavery, forced pregnancy, 
or enforced sterilisation as crimes against humanity or war crimes; and 
attacks on schools and hospitals as war crimes. Sexual slavery of chil-
dren is expressly mentioned in the Elements of Crimes. Children similarly 
would suffer unique harm from the crime against humanity of persecu-
tion, if perpetrated by reason of the victim's age. 
14 Diane Marie Amann, 'Calling Children to Account: The Proposal for a Juvenile 
Chamber in the Special Court for Sierra Leone·, (2001) 29 Pepperdi11e Law 
Rei•iew 167. 
15 Rome Statute, articles 54( 1 )(b), 68( 1 ), (2). See also article 84 (authorising 
pos~ humous revision of sentence on request of a convicted person·s child). 
16 Cecile Aptel, 'Unpunished Crimes: The Special Court for Sierra Leone and 
Children', in Charles Jalloh, ed., The Sierra Leone Special Court a11d Its Legacy, 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 340-60, at p. 341, n.3. 
-----
p 
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Given these developments, it is little surprise that crimes against chil-
dren figured prominently in the work of both the International Criminal 
Court and the Special Court for Sierra Leone. As discussed below, although 
decisions in the latter Court concentrated on child soldiering, over time 
the docket of the International Criminal Court grew to include additional 
charges involving child victims. 
Special Court for Sierra Leone and crimes against children 
Endemic during the 1990s civil war that wracked Sierra Leone were 
accounts of young people - sometimes, very young ch ildren - who toted 
AK-47s and committed atrocities. Typical was the 1999 report of a teen-
aged veteran who boasted: 'We attacked everybody. We feared nobody. 
We were very bold. Everybody is knowing our hot tempers.' 17 Stories 
of such children, and of persons of all ages victimised by their actions, 
stirred what has been called the 'international legal imagination', 18 and 
so led to the legal developments just discussed. ln the end, Special Coun 
prosecutors chose not to exercise their statutory authority to charge per-
sons as young as fifteen; nor did they allege crimes against girls pursu-
ant to the incorporated Sierra Leonea n law. 19 Prosecutors did, however, 
pursue charges related to the recruitment and use of child soldiers. 
The prohibition against child soldiering survived an early challenge 
in the Special Court. In Prosecutor v. Norman , a former Sierra Leonean 
government minister accused of recruitin g or using chi ldren under fifteen 
in a pro-government militia asserted that such conduct was not crimi-
nal under customary international law. Over the dissent of one judge, a 
four-member Appeals Chamber held otherwise. Surveying the evolution 
of the prohibition contained in the Special Court's statute, the majority 
17 Josep Sonah, then nineteen, quoted in Colin Nickerson, "Albright to see Peace's 
High Price in Sierra Leone' , Boston Globe, 18 October 1999, P· A I. 
18 Mark A. Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 9. 
19 Cecile Aptel, 'Unpunished Crimes: The Special Court for Sierra Leone and 
Children', in Charles Jalloh, ed., The Sierra Leone Special Courr and Its 
Legacy, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014, PP· 340-360, at P· ~56; 
David M. Crane, ·Prosecuting Children in Times of Conflict: The West Afn can 
Experience', (2008) 15/3 Human Rights Brief 11. 
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ruled, first, that an 'overwhelming majority of States' did not recruit such 
children and in fact had 'criminal ised such behaviour' at the time in ques-
tion, a nd second, that the government of Sierra Leone was on notice of 
this 'customary norm'.20 One commentator saw in this 2004 decision 'the 
beginning of a trend ... to take seriously the issue of crimes concerning 
children, and to prosecute those responsible for such violations, both to 
exact retribution from the offender, as well as to send a message of deter-
rence to others'.21 
Consequent efforts at prosecution nevertheless met with mixed results. 
The accused in No rman died before the Trial Chamber's verdict issued. In 
that verdict, one co-accused was acquitted of the child-soldiering count, 
and the child-soldiering conviction of the third co-accused was over-
turned on appeal.22 In contrast, in the two cases involving leaders of rebel 
groups, a ll but one accused was convicted at trial of recruiting or using 
child soldiers, and all five such convictions were susta ined on appeal.21 
The Special Court's final trial resulted in the conviction of former Liberian 
President Charles Taylor on eleven counts, including a charge of aid-
ing and abetting the rebel groups' recrui tment or use of boys and girls 
under fifteen.24 In 2013 that judgment, plus another imposing a sentence 
of fifty years in prison, withstood the accused's appellate challenge.25 
The 349-page appeals judgment deta iled fmdings not only of systematic 
harms that children suffered in armed groups, but also of sexual and 
gender-based violence against v icti ms described as 'women and girls', 
without further age differentiation .26 
20 Prosec:u1or v. Norman (SCSL-04-14-AR-72(E)), Decision on Preliminary 
Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), 31 May 2004, 
paras. 51-2. 
2 1 Max du Plessis, 'Children under lnternationaJ Criminal Law', (2004) 1 J African 
Sec11riry Rei•iew 103, at p. 108. 
22 Prosec111or v. Fofa11a et a l. (SCSL-04- 14-A), Appeals Judgment, 28 May 2008. 
23 Prosec11tor v. Sesay et aJ. (SCSL-04- 15-A), Appeals Judgment, 26 October 
2009; Prosec11ror v. Brima et a l. (SCSL-04- 16-A), Appeals Judgment, 22 
February 2008. 
24 Prosec11torv. Tay/or(SCSL-03-01-T) Judgment, 30 May 201 2. 
25 P~osec11tor v. Taylor (SCSL-03-01 -A), Appeals Judgment, 26 September 201 3. 
26 Ibid., paras. 260-73. 
Early child-specific jurisprudence of the International 
Criminal Court 
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By the time the Special Court's Appeals Chamber issued its judgment in 
Taylor, the International Criminal Court a lready had concluded two tri-
als involving child-soldiering charges, against three defendants. Another 
person accused of crimes inv olving children was in custody following 
his surrender to the court, and a handful o f others so charged remained 
at large. 
The first International Criminal Court trial , Prosecutor v. Lubanga, per-
tained exclusively to allegations that the accused, a former leader of a 
Congolese rebel group, was responsible as an indirect co-perpetrator for 
the war crimes of 'conscripting o r enlisting children under the age of 
15 years ... or using them to partic ipate actively in hostilities'. This sin-
gular focus signalled '[t]hat children come first, at the top of our con-
temporary priorities when dealing with the victims of armed conflict', 
one commentator wrote.27 The focus on children drew sustained criticism, 
however, from victims' g roups and other non-governmental organisa-
tions usually supportive of the Office of the Prosecu tor; they complained 
in particular that despite available evidence, sexua l and gender-based 
crimes had not been charged.28 The Trial Chamber would echo such criti -
cism in its post-trial judgments. 
Compounding these difficulties, the reliance on child victims in 
Lubanga soon gave rise to problems of proof. The very first w itness began 
his testimony by recanting a prior statement that he had been abducted 
and forced to serve as a child so ldier in the defendant's militia. Trial was 
put on hold for a week, and eventually the witness testified in accord-
ance with the prior statement. In its verdict, however, the Trial Chamber 
rejected as unreliable not just his testimony but that of all witnesses 
27 William A. Schabas, 'Commentary on: Children and Armed Confl ict', in Noelle 
Quenivet and Shilan Shah-Davis, eds., Jnternatio11al Law and Anned Conflict, 
The Hague: TMC·Asser Press, 2010, pp. 283-7, at p. 283. 
28 Margaret M. deGuzman, 'Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection a~ the 
International Criminal Court' (201 2) 33 Michigan Journal of International 
Law 265, at p. 273. See Dian~ Marie Amann, 'Children and th~ F~t Verdict 
of the International Criminal Court·, (2013) 12 Washington Unwers,ry Global 
Studies Law Review 4 11 , at pp. 424-8. 
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who said they had been child soldiers. Yet it credited the testimony of 
two experts and of a UN official w ho h ad worked with child combatants 
demobilised after the Congolese conflict. Pivotal was the Trial Chamber's 
viewing of a video in whlch the defendant rallied troops while surrounded 
by bodyguards who, in the eyes of the judges, were 'recrui ts who were 
clearly under the age of 15'.29 In a trilogy of 2012 decisions, therefore, 
the Trial Chamber: convicted the d efendant of conscription, enlistment, 
and use in a non-international a rmed conflict; imposed a concurrent 
fourteen-year sentence; and outlined a framework for the award of repa-
rations to victims of the crimes of conviction. 
Late in 2014, a majority of the five-member Appeals Chamber sustained 
the conviction and sentence in Lubanga.30 ln so doing, it issued a number of 
important rulings with respect to child-soldiering crimes. First, it rejected the 
defence challenge to the manner by which child victims had been determined 
to meet the Rome Statute's age threshold. The Appeals Chamber ruled that 
' it suffices that it is established that the v ictim is within a certain age range, 
namely under the age of 15 years', and further held that in the absence of 
precise records, age is a factual finding to be determined case-by-case.11 It 
also accepted the testimony about children's ages that the judgment below 
credited, as well as the trial judges' fmding that the rally video depicted child 
soldiers under f1fteen.12 Second, the Appeals Chamber clarified the relation-
ship between 'conscripting' and 'enlisting' children. The defence in Lubanga 
had argued that the Trial Chamber e rred as a matter of law when it wrote that 
conscription, or forcible recruitment, and enl istment, or voluntary enrolment, 
'are dealt with together'.33 The Appeals Chamber stressed that the two crimes 
29 Prosecutor v. Luba11ga (ICC-0 I /04-0 J-06), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of 
the Statute, 14 March 2012, para. 792. 
30 Prosecurorv. Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06 A 5), Judgment on the Appeal of Mr 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo aga inst his Conviction, I December 2014; Prosecuror 
v. Luba11ga (ICC-01/04-01/06 A 4 A 6), Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo against the 'Decision on Sentence Pursuant to Article 76 of 
the Statute·, I December 2014. Judge Anita Usacka would have reversed the 
co~viction on grounds of insufficient evidence, whi le Judge Sang-Hyun Song 
obJected to the majority's treatment of child-soldiering crimes. 
31 Prosecutorv. Luba11ga (ICC-01/04-01 /06 A 5), Judgment on the Appeal of Mr 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against his Conviction, I December 2014, para. 198 
(emphasis in the original). 
32 Ibid. , paras. 207-62. 33 Ibid., para. 268. 
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are distinct because only conscription entails an element of compulsion, 
and it next found in the trial record sufficient evidence of such compulsion. 
A related defence argument, that conviction for conscription depended upon 
proof of lack of consent by the child, was dismissed; 'the elements of these 
crimes', the Chamber explained, 'focus on the conduct of the perpetrator'.34 
Finally, the Appeals Chamber weighed in on how to interpret 'using ... 
ro participate actively in hostilities', a statutory phrase with which other 
judges in the International Criminal Court and in the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone already had grappled. In Lubanga, the Trial Chamber major-
ity had ruled that the phrase encompassed not only front-line combat, 
but also situations when 'support provided by the child to the combatants 
exposed him or her to a rea l danger as a potential target'.35 The lone dis-
senter preferred a much broader interpretation. Arguing that the phrase 
encompassed not only supportive roles within a zone of danger, but also 
'the sexual violence and other ill-treatment suffered by girls and boys·, 
without regard to location, she wrote: 'The use of young girls' and boys' 
bodies by combatants within or outside the group is a war crime and 
as such encoded in the charges against the accused '.36 On appeal, the 
defence characterised even the majority's middle-path interpretation as 
too broad. It endeavoured to equate ' using .. . to participate actively in 
hostilities' with 'direct participation', an international humanitarian law 
concept that defines who is protected, and who may be targeted for kill-
ing, in times of armed conflict. 37 The Appeals Chamber rejected this claim 
of interchangeability. But it also rejected the Trial Chamber majority's 
construction, in favour of its own ' plain interpretation of the relevant 
provisions in their context'; in brief, the Appeals Chamber held that the 
crime of using children depends on proof of a 'link between the activity 
34 Ibid., para. 302. 
35 Prosecutor v. Luba11ga (ICC-Ol /04-0 1-06), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of 
the Statute, 14 March 2012, para. 627. 
36 Prosecutorv. Luba11ga (ICC-01/04-01-06), Separate a nd Dissenting. Opi~i~n of 
Judge Odio Benito, 14 March 2012, paras. 16, 2 1 (punctuation as m ongmal). 
37 Prosecutor v. Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06 A 5), Judgment on the Appeal of 
Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against his Conviction, 1 December ~0 14, paras. 
315-20 (citing, inter alia, Additional Protocol 1, article 51(3), which exten~ 
protections to civilians ·unless and for such time as they take a direct part 10 
hostilities'). 
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for which the child is used and the co mbat in which the armed force or 
group of the perpetrator is engaged'.38 
Reluctant to delineate proscribed and permitted uses 'in view of the 
complex and unforeseeable scenarios presented by the rapidly changing 
face of warfare in the modern world', the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga 
called for case-by-case analysis. 39 It drew gujdance from International 
Committee of the Red Cross commentaries, which included witrun the 
meaning of use 'military operations such as gathering information, 
transmitting orders, transporting ammun itions and foodstuffs, or acts of 
sabotage·, as well as 'gathering and transmjssion of military informa-
tion, transportation of arms and munitions, provision of supplies etc'.4° 
Also consulted was a draft Rome Statute report, which included 'mili-
tary activities linked to combat such as scouting, spying, sabotage and 
the use of children as decoys, couriers or at military checkpoints', and 
excluded 'activities clearly unrelated to the hostilities such as food deliv-
eries to an airbase or the use of domestic staff in an officer's married 
accommodation'.41 Sexual violence and other conduct of concern to the 
dissenter in the Lubanga trial judgment clearly fe ll outside the bounds 
of this construction. Within the posited meaning of use, however, was 
conduct for which the Trial Chamber had ruled the defendant responsi-
ble: 'the deployment of children under the age of fifteen years as soldiers 
and their participation in combat, as well as their use as military guards 
and bodyguards', as the Appeals Chamber described it.42 Accordingly, the 
International Criminal Court's first tria l concluded with affirmance of the 
judgment of conviction for crimes of child soldiering. 
Acquittals in child-soldiering cases 
The Internacional Criminal Court's second trial took a turn very different 
from the proceedings in Lubanga. At issue was an attack that a rival rebel 
group had launched on a single day in Bogoro, a Congolese village said 
to harbour members of the militia over whlch the defendant in Lubanga 
once presided. Two leaders of that rival group stood trial in Prosecuror 
38 Ibid., paras. 333, 335; see also para. 324. 
39 Ibid., para. 335. 40 Ibid., para. 334. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., para. 340; see also paras. 341-433. 
-
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v. Katanga and Ngudjolo, for multiple crimes against civilia ns, including 
the use of 'children under I 5 years for mul t ipl e purposes and to partici-
pate actively ... prior to, during, and following the attack'.43 The cases 
were severed after trial concluded in 2012, yet in the end, both defendants 
were acquitted of the child-soldiering offence. 
Before detailing its reasons for acqui tting the defendant in Ngudjolo 
on all counts, the Trial Cha mber, in a judgment subsequently upheld on 
appeal, emphasised its adherence to the Rome Statute provision that pre-
sumes innocence unless and until an accused is proved gui lty 'au-de/a 
de tout doute raisonnable' -literally, 'beyond every reasonable doubt'.44 
It then ruled that essential facts had not been proved. As in lubanga, 
judges found fault with persons w ho had testified that they were militia 
members. Concluding after extended analysis that three such prosecu-
tion witnesses were 'imprecise' and 'contradictory', the Chamber rejected 
their testimony in its entirety.45 Unlike in Lubanga, in Ngudjolo the same 
fate befell videos introduced into evidence, all of which post-dated the 
attack.46 The Trial Chamber did find that the presence of child combatants 
was 'un plzenomene generalise', o r 'a widespread phenomenon', during 
the period in question, and further that 'children under 15 years, some 
carrying blades, ... were present' at the attack itself.47 Nevertheless, with 
respect to allegations that the accused had ordered military training for 
underage children or used them as bodyguards or for other purposes, 
the Chamber wrote in its 201 2 judgment of acquittal that the credited 
evidence failed to establish the requis ite nexus between the accused and 
child soldiers.48 
43 Prosecutor v. Ngudjo/o (ICC-Ol /04-02/ l 2), Jugement Rendu en Application de 
!'article 74 du Statut, 18 December 2012, para. 504 (brackets around ellipsis 
and internal quotations omitted); Prosecutor v. Kata11ga (ICC-01/04-01/07), 
Jugement Rendu en Application de !'article 74 du Statut, 7 March 2014, 
para. 1025. 
44 Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo (ICC- 01 /04-02/ 12), Jugement Rendu en Application de 
l'anicle 74 du Statut, 18 December 2012, para. 35. See Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo 
(ICC-01/04-02/ 12 A), Judgment on the Prosecutor's Appeal against the Deci-
sion of Trial Chamber II entitled 'Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the 
Statute', 27 February 2015. 
45 Ibid., paras. 157-9, 189-90, 2 18- 9. 
46 Ibid., paras. 444, 463, 480, 500. 47 Ibid. , para. 516. 
48 Ibid. 
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The defendant in Kata11ga likew ise was acquitted of child soldiering, 
even though he was convicted on other counts in a judgment issued 
early in 2014. Considerable evidence had revealed 'a s ignificant phe-
nomenon of the utilisation of child sold iers, aged seven to seventeen 
years, integrated into the ranks of different armed groups then active', 
the same Trial Chamber which had passed judgment in Ngudjolo wrote 
in Katanga.49 During the attack on Bogoro out of which the case arose, 
'children armed with guns, machetes, lances or arrows, fought along-
side combatants', the Chamber continued; moreover, the evidence 
established that some of those children were younger than fifteen.50 Yet 
no conviction issued. Doubts abo ut some witnesses' reliability, coupled 
with uncertai nty about specific ch ild soldiers' ages, compelled the con-
clusion that the defendant o n tria l had not been proved responsible for 
the prohibited use of underage children.51 
A more comprehensive policy on children 
While these prosecutions for the recrui tment and use of child soldiers 
were unfolding, the Court's second Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, assumed 
office. The transition marked a change in strategy. The decision to charge 
only child-soldiering offences in Lubanga had provoked objections 
from judges, victims, and commentators alike, and proceedings before 
and during trial had laid bare investigat ive and evidentiary challenges. 
Commentary also took note of the complex nature of child soldiering. 
Although many children were victims kidnapped into armed groups and 
forced to wield weapons, other ch ildren chose to do so, even though the 
law declined to g ive weight to their offers of consent; moreover, child 
combatants who com mitted international crimes victimised others, per-
sons also deserving of redress. Jncreasingly, expansive interpretations of 
the s tatutory phrase 'using ... to participate actively in hostilities' were 
said also to expa nd the scope of children who might become legitimate 
49 Prosecutor v. Kata11ga (ICC-01/04-01 /07), Jugement Rendu en Application de 
rarticle 74 du Statut, 7 March 2014, para. 1052; see also paras. 1053-9. 
50 Ibid., paras. 1060, 1065; see also paras. 1061-4. 
51 Ibid., paras. 1066- 88. The trial judgment became fi nal after the withdrawal of 
cross-appeals; the defendant is serving a twelve-year sentence on the counts 
for which he was convicted. 
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targets of warfare.52 Perhaps in tacit recognition of considerations like 
these, shortly before taking office in mid 2012 Bensouda made a statement 
she would often repeat: 'Our focus should shift from "children with arms" 
to "children who are affected by the arms" in the context of the crime of 
enlisting and conscripting child soldiers'. 53 The Office of the Prosecutor 
subsequently identified 'particular attention to ... crimes against children' 
as one of its six strategic goals, and began preparing a Policy Paper on 
Children, a process that included consultations with experts in academia 
and civil society. 54 
International Criminal Court judges, meanwhile, agreed to enlarge the 
scope of proceedings in one case involving offences against children. To 
be precise, in 2012 judges approved a request from the Prosecutor to sup-
plement the initial arrest warrant for a fugitive Congolese rebel leader 
who had been accused solely of child-soldiering crimes in 2006, at the 
same time as his alleged ally, the defendant in Lubanga.55 Bosco Ntaganda 
surrendered in 2013 to face charges that he was responsible not only 
for the prohibited conscription, enl istment, and use of children, but also 
for a range of generic crimes, and for the wa r crimes of rape and sex-
ual slavery perpetrated by his troops against children under fifteen in 
the same militia.56 Before a Pre-Trial Chamber, he contended that 'the 
crimes of rape and sexual slavery against these persons are not foreseen 
by the Statute, as international humanitarian law does not protect per-
sons taking part in hostilities from crimes committed by other persons 
52 E.g., Roman Graf, 'The In ternational Criminal Court and Child Soldiers: An 
Appraisal of the Lubanga Judgment', (2012) JO Journal of international Criminal 
Justice 1, at pp. 16-2 1; Chris Jenks, ' Law as Shield, Law as Sword: The ICC's 
Lubanga Decision, Child Sold ie rs and the Perverse Mutualism of Participation 
in Hostilities', (2013) 3 University of Miami National Security and Armed 
Co11jlict law Review 106. 
53 Fatou Bensouda, 'The Incidence of the Female Child Soldier and the 
International Criminal Court', 4 June 2012, keynote speech before the Eng 
Aja Eze Foundation in New York. 
54 Office of the Prosecutor, Strategic Plan June 2012-2015, 11 October 2013, 
para. 3. 
55 Prosecutor v. Ntaganda (ICC-01 /04-02/06), Decision on the Prosecutor's 
Application under Article 58, 12 July 2012. 
56 Prosecutor v. Ntaga11da (lCC-01/04-02/06), Decision Pursuant to Article 6J(7) 
(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor against Bosco 
Ntaganda, 9 June 2014, paras. 36, 7 4. 
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taking part in hostilities on the sa me side of the a rmed contlict:57 The 
Chamber disagreed. It noted that common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions protects '[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities', 
while Additional Protocol U protects 'persons who do not take a direct 
part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities', and forbids in particu-
lar 'rape, enforced prostitution and any form o f indecent assault against 
persons·.ss The Pre-Trial Chamber then proceeded to conside r whether the 
child soldiers in question 'were taking direct/active part in hostilities at 
the time they were victims of acts of rape and/or sexual slavery'.59 That 
framing virtually compelled a negative reply. As stated by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber: 
[T]hose subject to rape and/or sexual enslavement cannot be considered to 
have taken active part in hostilities during the specific time when they were 
subject to acts of sexual nature, including rape, as defined in the relevant 
Elements of Crimes. The sexual character of these crimes, which involve 
elements of force/coercion or the exercise of rights of ownership, logically 
preclude active participation in hostilities at the same t ime.60 
The conclusion jibed with that of the Special Court for Sierra Leone trial 
verdict in Taylor, as the Pre-Trial Chamber recognised. 61 But in the earlier 
case the indictment had not specified sexual abuse against child soldiers; 
rather, the Special Court's reasoning arose out of the facts as adduced at 
trial, as proof of more generic charges. The confirmation of these rape and 
sexual slavery charges in Ntaganda thus was a milestone. Combined with 
the confirmation of additional, generic charges, it suggested a new recep-
tivity to including, within the narrative of International Criminal Court 
proceedings, the full range of children's experiences amid armed conflict 
and analogous violence.62 
57 Tbid., para. 76 (parenthetical acronym omitted). 
58 Ibid., para. 77. 59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., para. 79. 61 Ibid., para. 79, n. J 18. 
62 The reference to 'analogous violence' is intended to encompass situations 
yielding to crimes that occur outside of armed conflict yet lie within the 
International Criminal Court's jurisdiction; for example, genocide, which may 
be commiued in times of peace and war alike, and crimes against humanity, 
commirted in the course of widespread or systematic attacks against civilian 
populations. 
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Challenges to prevention and punishment 
It must be noted that the new charges laid in Ntaganda constituted an 
exercise of prosecutorial restraint, perhaps influenced by the actual evi-
dence to be proffered at the trial. For the Pre-Trial Chamber's reasoning, 
though applied in that case to children under fifteen, invited extension 
in future cases to older children; indeed, to all persons in militias who 
have been subjected to abuses prohibited by international humanitarian 
law. Over time, moreover, the logic of the Ntaganda confirmation decision 
may prove a bit too neat. Accurately referring to 'the Pre-Trial Chamber's 
construction of a binary in which a child soldier is either subjected to sex-
ual violence or taking direct part in hostilities', one commentator probed 
the boundaries of that binary: ' Is the victim only subject to sexual slavery 
in the moment when he or she is forced to engage in a sexual act, or for 
so long as the perpetrator exercises rights of ownership? And does the 
sexual slavery stop if the victim is made to take part in hostilities, only 
to resume at some future point in time?'63 The friction inherent in such 
questions is salutary: it may spark an analysis of text and purpose that 
synthesises legal sources - not only the Geneva Conventions and other 
humanitarian law, but also the Children's Convention and other child 
rights and human rights law - in order to arrive at a deeper explication 
of the extent to which international law protects persons against abuse 
within armed groups. 
This is but one jurisprudential cha llenge to the development of an 
effective structure for the prevention and pu nishment of international 
crimes against children. As the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga observed, 
even though its decision con firmed the core of criminalised conduct, it 
remains for future rulings to affirm the full contours of the prohibition 
against conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years 
into armed forces or groups, or using them to participate actively in hos-
tilities.64 Furthermore, the acquittals of some commanders charged with 
child-soldiering crimes point to a need for continued fine-tuning of the 
63 Rosemary Grey, The Ntaganda Confirmation of Charges Decision: A Victory 
for Gender Justice?', Beyo11d the Hague, 12 June 2014. 
64 Proserntorv. Luba11ga (ICC-01 /04-0J/06 A 5), Judgment on the Appeal of Mr 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against his Conviction, I December 201 4, para. 335. 
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modes by which accused superiors are to be held criminally responsible 
for conduct committed by thei r subordinates. 
Issues of evidence gathering a nd reliabili ty loomed large in numerous 
cases involving children. Such cases frequently wi ll require the presen-
tation of witnesses who were child ren when alleged events occurred. To 
the extent that such testimony can be corroborated, by the testimony of 
adults and witnesses or by physical eyjdence, the rights both of child wit-
nesses and adult accused will be better served. Posing a particular eviden-
tiary hurdle is an element unique to the Rome Statute's child-soldiering 
crimes; specif1cally, that the affected children must not have reached their 
fifteen th birthday. Absent birth certificates or other v ital records - docu-
ments often scarce in times of war - this is an especially difficult fact 
to prove. The use of rough markers, such as whether a boy's voice has 
changed, o r whether a girl's breasts have developed, may have the effect 
of depriving some children of due protection - for example, children who 
have reached puberty early and thus are wrongly assumed to be fifteen or 
older. Considering that the two treaties raising the age threshold to eight-
een enjoy more Member States than the Rome Statute, an amendment on 
this point may merit examination. 
The International Crimina l Court and related tribunals typically are set 
up to pursue only those persons believed to bear grave responsibility. In 
order to enhance prevention and punishment, international criminal just-
ice mechanisms thus must endeavour to work with national legal systems, 
with the United Nations and kindred international a nd regional entities, 
and with ciyj l society, not to mention with children themselves.65 Also 
in order would be support for international instruments aimed at end-
ing war or minimising the effects of conflict; to name a few, the treaties 
outlawing landmines, cluster munitions, and arms trafficking, as well as 
the 2010 Kampala Amendments tha t would make the crime of aggression 
punishable before the Internatio nal Criminal Court. This complementary 
approach does not mean that all lesser offenders - let alone all child 
offenders - eventually must face criminal charges in some forum. To the 
contrary, children o nce associated with armed groups, not to mention 
65 General Comment No. 12, UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/ 12; Virginie Ladisch, 'Children 
and Youth Participation in Transitiona l Justice Processes', (2013) 6 Jou ma/ of 
the History of Childhood and Youth 505. 
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other persons victimised by armed groups, may benefit far more from 
non-criminal means of rehabilitation, reintegration, and reconciliation.66 
finally, there is a need for a richer understand in g of the manifold 
ways thar armed conflict and similar violence affect children. When the 
evidence merits, child-specific crimes must be prosecured to the full-
est extent - not only the oft-charged child-soldiering crimes, but also 
offences like child trafficking, whenever they amount to crimes against 
humanity. Crimes that acutely affect children, such as sexual slavery or 
attacks on education, also must be pursued. When appropriate, allega-
tions of generic crimes like killing and pillage ought to emphasise the 
impact on children.67 In short, international criminal justice mechanisms 
must persist in giving priority to crimes against children, who, after all, 
embody the future of global society. 
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